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SUMMARY 
Monte Carlo simulation of an accident risk model of a complex safety critical operation provides valuable 
feedback to the decision makers that are responsible for the safety of such operation. By definition, such a Monte 
Carlo simulation model differs from reality at various points and levels. Hence, the feedback to the decision makers 
should include an assessment of the combined effect of these differences in terms of bias and uncertainty at the 
simulated risk level.  
In literature the assessment of risk bias and uncertainty due to differences in parameter values has received most 
attention, e.g. Morgan and Henrion (1990) [1], Kumamoto and Henley (1996) [2]. Obviously, there are many other 
differences between model and reality than due to parameter value differences only.  
The paper presents a structured approach for the assessment of bias and uncertainty in Monte Carlo simulation 
of accident risk due to differences in parameter values as well as differences that fall beyond the parameter level. For 
the assessment of differences in parameter values we follow the first-order differential analysis of bias and 
uncertainty in the accident risk under log-normal assumptions, e.g. [1], and combine bias and uncertainty estimates 
of parameter values with log-normal risk sensitivities for these parameter variations. Because the number of 
parameter values may be large, this assessment is performed in two phases. In the first phase an initial bias and 
uncertainty assessment of parameter values is performed largely using expert knowledge. The second phase focuses 
on the parameter values that have the largest effect on the risk level; for these, statistical data is collected and 
sensitivity analysis is performed by running dedicated Monte Carlo simulations.  
For the assessment of bias due to other differences than parameter value differences, the paper combines the two 
structured approaches by Zio and Apostolakis (1996) [3]. One of their approaches assumes alternate hypotheses for 
the risk case considered, develops an alternate model for each alternate hypothesis, assesses the risk level for each 
alternate model, and elicits experts on the probability that each alternate model is correct. Their second approach 
uses an adjustment factor to compensate for differences between model and reality, and elicits experts for the 
estimation of this adjustment factor. The novelty in this paper is to combine, per non-parameter difference, one 
alternate hypothesis with one adjustment factor, and to evaluate the bias through the following two estimates for each 
non-parameter difference: 
1. the probability that there is a difference, i.e. the alternate hypothesis is correct; and 
2. the conditional risk bias given that the alternate hypothesis is correct, i.e. the conditional adjustment factor.  
These estimates per non-parameter difference are evaluated by teams of safety experts and operational experts, and 
then combined into an overall bias estimate for all non-parameter differences. The estimation of these two factors by 
experts appears to work quite naturally, especially since the estimation of the conditional risk bias is supported by the 
risk sensitivity knowledge for each of the model parameters stemming from assessment of the parameter value 
differences. The novel structured bias and uncertainty assessment approach is illustrated for a Monte Carlo 
simulation based accident risk assessment for an air traffic operation example.    
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Within the large variety of safety critical industries, air traffic poses exceptional multi-agent communication and 
coordination challenges to the design of advanced operations. Each aircraft has its own crew, and each crew is 
communicating with several human operators in different air traffic management and airline operational control 
centers on the ground in order to timely receive instructions critical to a safe flight. The implication is that safety of 
air traffic is the result of highly distributed interactions between multiple human operators, procedures, and technical 
systems.  
Accident risk assessment through Monte Carlo simulation of novel air traffic operations provides valuable safety 
feedback to the designers and decision makers of these operations [4], [5]. Such Monte Carlo simulations are 
directed to nominal as well as non-nominal situations in air traffic situations and provide the basis for risk 
evaluations such as the probability of a collision between a pair of aircraft. By definition, a model differs from reality 
and the resulting accident risk results are uncertain and may be biased. Air traffic operation designers and decision 
makers are in need of feedback that includes an assessment of the bias and uncertainty of these differences and their 
combined effect at the level of accident risk.  
For assessment of uncertainty in risk assessment various approaches have been proposed (e.g., [1], [3], [6], [7], 
[8], [9]). One categorization in uncertainty sources is made by distinguishing between aleatory (or stochastic) and 
epistemic (or state-of-knowledge) uncertainties. Aleatory uncertainty reflects the inherent randomness of processes 
and is usually represented by probability distributions in the model itself. Epistemic uncertainty reflects restrictions 
in the state-of-knowledge used for the development of the model. Another categorization is made by distinguishing 
between uncertainties that arise from phases in computational modeling and simulation. For instance, [3] 
distinguishes conceptual model uncertainty, mathematical model uncertainty and computer code uncertainty. A more 
detailed categorization is used in [8], which considers uncertainty due to activities related to conceptual modeling, 
mathematical modeling, discretization and algorithm selection, computer programming, numerical solution, and 
solution representation. In spite of the recognition of these wide ranges of types of uncertainty in realistic accident 
risk assessment problems, until recently the assessment of uncertainty in parameter1 values has attracted the largest 
part of academic interest, as is illustrated by [9]. Obviously, there are many other types of differences than those 
related to parameter values, for example: numerical approximations, model structural differences, hazards that are 
not incorporated in the model, differences between the assumed and the operational concept in reality. In preparation 
to assessing the effect of differences between model and reality, all types of differences have to be identified first, 
and subsequently each difference has to be formulated in terms of an unambiguous model assumption.  
For the larger set of differences between accident risk model and reality, Zio and Apostolakis [3] developed two 
rather unique approaches for a structured assessment of bias and uncertainty. One method assumes alternate 
hypotheses, develops models for each hypothesis, assesses the risk level for each of these models, and elicits experts 
on the probability that each model is correct. The second method uses an adjustment factor to compensate for the 
differences, and elicits experts for the estimation of this adjustment factor. In this paper we combine the adjustment 
factor and alternate hypotheses approaches of [3] into one method. The key towards this is a decomposition of an 
adjustment factor for each model structural difference into a product of two factors: 1) how often does the difference 
not apply, and 2) how severe is the difference when applicable. The estimation of these two factors by experts 
appears to work quite naturally, especially since the severity estimation is supported by risk sensitivity knowledge for 
each of the simulation model parameters. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, Chapter 2 develops the mathematical framework of bias and 
uncertainty, based on [10]. Chapter 3 develops the bias and uncertainty assessment process. Chapter 4 illustrates its 
application to an en-route air traffic scenario. Chapter 5 provides a discussion of results. 
2  MATHEMATICS OF BIAS AND UNCERTAINTY ASSESSMENT 
2.1  Mathematical problem definition 
Accident risk is assessed by first developing a stochastic accident risk model, which includes adoption of 
assumptions. For the formal bias and uncertainty assessment approach [10] we distinguish assumed parameter 
values v and other model assumptions a : 
                                                           
1
 In this paper, a parameter is a variable that assumes a Euclidean or integer value, e.g. mean time between failures of a particular system. 
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• 1{ , , }pnv v v= …  are the parameter values assumed in the accident risk model, with pn  the number of 
parameters, and 
• 1{ , , }
a
n
a a a= …  are the other model assumptions (i.e. non-parameter assumptions), with 
a
n  the number of 
other model assumptions. 
In order to capture bias and uncertainty within a mathematical setting, we represent each parameter value assumption 
and each model assumption as one random variable, and collect all these random variables into two random vectors: 
• 1( , , )pnV V V= …  is a vector of random variables for the parameter values in the accident risk model, 
• 1( , , )
a
n
A A A= …  is a vector of random Booleans, where 1iA =  if model assumption ia  holds true, and 0iA =  
if model assumption ia  does not hold true. 
We denote the actual risk as ( , )A Vρ . If all assumptions would have no effect at the risk level, then accident risk 
equals the conditional expectation of ( , )A Vρ  given the parameter values are equal to v  and all other assumptions 
hold true, i.e., accident risk would be equal to: 
 
 ( , ) { ( , ) | , }v E A V A V vρ ρ= = =1 1 , (1) 
with (1, ,1)≜ …1  a vector with all ones.  
It is the aim of the bias and uncertainty assessment to characterize stochastic properties of ( , )A Vρ , such as 
expected value and 95% uncertainty interval, in terms of ( , )vρ 1 and the stochastic properties of V  and A . 
2.2  Mathematics for parameter values 
In order to evaluate assumptions due to (random) differences in parameter values, we develop a characterization 
of ( , )Vρ 1  in terms of ( , )vρ 1 . For this we define for each parameter a multiplicative bias ( ) /i i ib E V v≜  and a 
length il of the 95% credibility interval for the value of the ith parameter, such that Pr{ [ / , ]} 0.95i i i i i i iV b v l b v l∈ = . 
Given this multiplicative character of parameter value variations, it is customary to assume that iV  is lognormally 
distributed [2], [3]. For the evaluation of the effect of variation in a parameter value we define the log-sensitivity of 
the risk for parameter variation [10]: 
 
ln ( , ) ( , )
ln ( , )
i
i i
i
vv v
v v v
s
ρ ρ
ρ
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
=≜
1 1
1
, (2) 
which is equal to the normalized sensitivity or elasticity defined in [1], as is shown in the right-hand-side of Eq. (2). 
The assessment approach of this paper characterizes the bias and uncertainty in the risk in terms of ib , il  and is . 
Under a number of conditions it can be shown [10] that the expected value and the 95% credibility interval of 
( , )Vρ 1  are, respectively,  
 
1
8{ ( , )} ( , ) exp( )E V v B Uρ ρ= × ×
⌢ ⌢
1 1 , (3) 
 Pr{ ( , )  ( , ) exp( ), ( , ) exp( ) 0.95}V v B U v B Uρ ρ ρ∈ × × − × × =   
⌢ ⌢ ⌢ ⌢
1 1 1 , (4) 
where  
 
1
p
i
n
i
i
sB b
=
∏
⌢
≜  (5) 
is the total bias due to all bias contributions of the parameter value assumptions, and  
 
| | 2
1
(ln )
p
i
n
s
i
i
U
=
∑
⌢
ℓ≜  (6) 
is due to all uncertainty contributions of the parameter value assumptions. It should be noticed that in this approach 
all parameter variations are treated as being independent of each other.  
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2.3  Mathematics for bias due to other differences  
In this paper we assume that model assumptions due to other differences (i.e. those that are not differences in 
parameter values) impose bias on the expected value of the risk, but do not have effect on the size of the 95% 
credibility interval of the risk. Hence, these other differences are assumptions to have a bias imposed factorΨ  in risk 
only: 
 
  { ( , )}/ { ( , )}E A V E Vρ ρΨ ≜ 1 . (7) 
For this factor Ψ , we adopt the following factorization: 
 
1
a
n
i
i
=
Ψ = Ψ∏ , (8) 
 
1 1
1
|
|
{ ( , ) 1, , 1}
{ ( , ) 1, , 1}
i
i
i
A
A
E A V A
E A V A
ρ
ρ
−
=
= =
Ψ
= =
…
…
. (9) 
 
Now we define: 
 
f
1 1  {Pr 0 | 1, , 1}i i ip A A A−= = =≜ … ,  (10) 
 
f 1 1
1
  
{ ( , ) | 1, , 1, 0
{ ( , ) | 1, , 1
}
}i
i i
i
A
A
E A V A A
q
E A V A
ρ
ρ
−
= = =
= =
≜
…
…
. (11) 
Within the context of the alternate hypotheses and adjustment factor approaches of [3], the probability fip that 
assumption ia  is false can be interpreted as the probability of the alternate hypothesis that assumption ia  is false, 
and the conditional risk bias fiq  given that assumption ia  is false can be interpreted as an adjustment factor. With the 
above definitions of fip  and 
f
iq , (9) can be shown to satisfy: 
 
f f f(1 )i i i ip q pΨ = + − . (12) 
Substituting (12) in (8) and evaluation yields:  
 
1
f f1 ( 1)
a
n
i
i ip q
=
Ψ = + −  ∏ . (13) 
Combining the above results, the expected risk due to the bias and uncertainty of the parameter value 
assumptions and the bias of non-parameter assumptions yields 
 
1
8( , ) exp( ){ ( , )} { ( , )} v B UE A V E V ρρ ρ= Ψ× Ψ× × ×=
⌢ ⌢
11 , (14) 
with Ψ , B
⌢
 and U
⌢
 satisfying equations (13), (5) and (6), respectively. Moreover, the 95% credibility interval due to 
the bias and uncertainty in parameter values and the bias of non-parameter assumptions satisfies: 
 Pr{   ( , ) exp( ), ( , ) exp( ) 0.95( , ) }v B U v B UA V ρ ρρ ∈ Ψ× × × − Ψ× × × =   
⌢ ⌢ ⌢ ⌢
1 1 . (15) 
In words, (15) means that with 95% probability, the risk lies in a credibility interval that ranges from a minimum 
level ( , ) exp( )v B UρΨ× × × −⌢ ⌢1  to a maximum level ( , ) exp( )v B UρΨ× × ×⌢ ⌢1 .  
3. BIAS AND UNCERTAINTY ASSESSMENT PROCESS 
As explained in Chapter 1, by definition, a Monte Carlo simulation model differs from reality at various points 
and levels. In order to get a hold on these differences, the first step is to identify them and to formulate them as 
model assumptions. Next, the assessment of bias and uncertainty due to these assumptions is done in the following 
three phases: 
1. initial evaluation of parameter value assumptions, 
2. simulation-supported evaluation of parameter value assumptions, and 
3. evaluation of other (i.e. non-parameter) assumptions. 
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3.1  Initial evaluation of parameter value differences 
A Monte Carlo simulation model of accident risk for a complex safety-critical operation typically includes a 
large number of parameter values. It may not be practically feasible to evaluate the risk sensitivity for all these 
parameter values by Monte Carlo simulations. Therefore, a first step in the bias and uncertainty assessment is an 
initial evaluation of the parameter value assumptions based on expert knowledge and available statistical data. This 
evaluation uses classes of the size of uncertainty and bias of parameter values, and the risk sensitivity for parameter 
variation. The classes shown in Table 1 have been developed to support this initial evaluation.  
Based on the classes in Table 1, initial judgments are acquired of the following items: 
• the direction (larger/smaller) and size of the bias ib  of each parameter, 
• the size of the 95% credibility interval il  of each parameter, 
• the sign and size of the risk sensitivity is  of each biased parameter, 
• the size of the risk sensitivity is of each unbiased parameter. 
This judgment is usually based on expert knowledge, or may be based on experimental or statistical data. The risk 
sensitivity of each parameter depends on the risk for which the evaluation is done.  
 
Table 1: Terminology for size of uncertainty, bias and risk sensitivity. 
Uncertainty il , bias ib  Risk sensitivity | |is  Qualitative term 
Modal value Interval Modal value Interval 
Major 10 [6.83, ∞] 4 [2.67, ∞] 
Considerable 5 [3.15, 6.83] 2 [1.33, 2.67] 
Significant 2.25 [1.75, 3.15] 1 [0.67, 1.33] 
Minor 1.5 [1.30, 1.75] 0.5 [0.33, 0.67] 
Small 1.2 [1.13, 1.30]  0.25 [0.17, 0.33] 
Negligible 1.1 [1, 1.13] 0.125 [0, 0.17] 
 
Based on the qualitative evaluations of the bias, the 95% credibility interval and the risk sensitivity of each 
parameter value, the risk uncertainty | |isil  for each parameter is determined using Table 2, and the risk bias i
s
ib  for 
each biased parameter is determined via a table for risk bias similar to Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Risk uncertainty as result of parameter uncertainty and associated risk sensitivity. 
Uncertainty il   Risk uncertainty | |is
il  Major Considerable Significant Minor Small Negligible 
Major Major Major Major Considerable Significant Minor 
Considerable Major Major Considerable Significant Minor Small 
Significant Major Considerable Significant Minor Small Negligible 
Minor Considerable Significant Minor Small Negligible Negligible 
Small Significant Minor Small Negligible Negligible Negligible 
R
isk
 
se
n
sit
iv
ity
 
| |is
 
Negligible Minor Small Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible 
3.2  Simulation-supported evaluation of parameter value differences 
Parameters values that were judged by experts to have a more than Negligible effect on the risk uncertainty or 
risk bias, are now evaluated using Monte Carlo simulation of the accident risk model. This is done in the following 
steps. 
• Make a list of all parameters that have a more than Negligible effect on the risk uncertainty and determine for 
each of these parameters a quantitative estimate of the length of the 95% credibility interval il . 
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• Make a list of all parameters that have a more than Negligible effect on the risk bias and determine for each of 
these parameters a quantitative estimate of the bias ib . 
• Perform Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate the log-sensitivity is  for all parameters identified in steps 1 and 2. 
The log-sensitivity is determined via first order estimation of the derivative of Eq. (2). 
• Determine the risk uncertainty | |isil  for each parameter assumption and combine these in Eq. (6) with the results 
of the expert-based evaluation of parameter assumptions (using the modal value for Negligible risk in Table 1). 
• Determine the risk bias isib for each biased parameter assumption and combine these in Eq. (5) with the results 
of the expert-based evaluation of parameter assumptions (using the modal value for Negligible risk in Table 1). 
3.3  Expert-based evaluation of other differences 
The evaluation of other differences (i.e. non-parameter assumptions) is based on expert elicitation and is 
supported by the insights gained from the sensitivity analysis and evaluation of the parameter value assumptions in 
the previous phases. The expert elicitation is supported by using classes for risk bias such as shown in Table 1 and 
classes for the probability that an assumption does not apply, as shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Qualitative terminology for the probability that an assumption does not apply. 
Probability fip  Qualitative term 
Modal value Interval 
Typical
 
0.8 [0.64. 1] 
Regular 0.4 [0.25, 0.64] 
Frequent
 
0.15 [0.09, 0.25] 
Less Frequent
 
0.06 [0.04, 0.09] 
Infrequent 0.028 [0.02, 0.04] 
Unlikely
 
0.01 [0, 0.02] 
 
The evaluation of the non-parameter assumptions is done by the following steps: 
• Order these assumptions such that efficient evaluation is supported. In accident risk assessment we considered, 
the usual order of classes of these assumptions is: a) numerical approximation assumptions, b) model structural 
assumptions, c) hazard coverage assumptions, d) operational concept assumptions. Within these classes a 
suitable ordering is also chosen. 
• Evaluate the probability that an assumption does not apply using the classes in Table 3, taking into consideration 
previous evaluations of dependent assumptions. 
• Evaluate the risk bias due to non-applicability of an assumption using the classes in Table 1. 
• Evaluate the combined effect of items 2 and 3 on the risk bias due to a non-parameter assumption via Table 4. 
• Evaluate the total bias due to the non-parameter assumptions by Eq. (13). 
 
Table 4: Risk bias due to probability and effect of the case that a non-parameter assumption does not apply 
Probability that assumption does not apply fip  Risk bias  f f1 )( 1i ip q+ −  Typical Regular Frequent Less 
frequent 
Infrequent Unlikely 
Major Major Considerable Significant Minor Small Negligible 
Considerable Considerable Significant Minor Small Negligible Negligible 
Significant Significant Minor Small Negligible Negligible Negligible 
Minor Minor Small Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible 
Small Small Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible 
Bi
a
s 
du
e 
to
 
n
o
n
-
a
pp
lic
a
bi
lit
y 
f
iq
 
Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible 
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4  EXAMPLE OF BIAS AND UNCERTAINTY ASSESSMENT OF AN AIR TRAFFIC OPERATION  
4.1  Accident risk model 
We consider an hypothetical air traffic example within an en-route sector that consists of two streams of air 
traffic, flying in opposite direction, at a single flight level. This example has been developed with the aim to 
understand how air traffic control (ATC) influences accident risk, and how far the nominal spacing S between 
opposite traffic streams can safely be reduced. 
For the hypothetical air traffic control example an accident risk Monte Carlo simulation model was developed 
[11] using Dynamically Coloured Petri Nets [4], [12]. It includes dynamic stochastic representation of aspects such 
as pilot performance, controller performance, aircraft dynamics, navigation, surveillance, radar, ATC flight plan and 
aircraft flight plan. During the development of the model, the following numbers of assumptions were adopted: 89 
parameter value assumptions, 24 numerical approximation assumptions, 23 model structural assumptions, 21 non-
covered hazards assumptions, and 5 operational concept assumptions. 
On the basis of the developed Petri Net model, Monte Carlo simulations were performed to evaluate probability 
distributions of the trajectories of the aircraft for a range of values for the lane spacing S. These Monte Carlo 
simulations addressed several combinations of nominal and non-nominal events regarding, e.g., communication 
systems, navigation systems, surveillance systems and modes of aircraft dynamics. Speed-up of the Monte Carlo 
simulation was achieved by decomposing the simulations in a sequence of conditional Monte Carlo simulations, and 
then combining the results of these conditional simulations [13]. Further processing of the data from the Monte Carlo 
simulations by a collision risk model gives the accident risk curve presented in Figure 1. The first part of the curve 
(up to about 10 km) is mostly determined by encounters between aircraft flying nominally along their lanes as 
expected by the air traffic controller. The second part of the curve (from about 10 km) is mostly determined by 
encounters between aircraft of which one makes an unexpected sharp turn. The model-based accident curve crosses 
the ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) defined target level of safety at a spacing of about 25S = km.    
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Figure 1 ATC routine monitoring model-based accident risk as function of lane spacing S (continuous 
line). Results of the bias and uncertainty assessment for S=25 km: expected accident risk (denoted by *) and 
95% credibility interval (bar). 
4.2  Bias and uncertainty assessment 
First the differences between model and reality of conventional en-route air traffic were identified, and 
formulated in terms of model assumptions. Next they were evaluated using the bias and uncertainty assessment steps 
of chapter 3. This particular evaluation was done by safety analysts and supported by expert interviews. The first step 
considered expert-based evaluation of parameter assumptions. About 80% of the parameter value assumptions were 
evaluated to have a Negligible risk uncertainty and 4% of the parameter values were considered biased, with only 
one parameter having a more than Negligible bias effect. Parameter value differences that potentially have a more 
than Negligible bias or uncertainty effect at the level of risk, were further evaluated using dedicated Monte Carlo 
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simulations. Some examples of the evaluation of the uncertainty in parameter values are given in Table 5; here, the 
quantitative values have been translated back to qualitative values according to Table 1. 
Using the insights gained by the bias and uncertainty assessment of the parameter value assumptions including 
the sensitivity analysis, the other differences between Monte Carlo simulation model and reality were evaluated. 
Table 6 shows examples of the assessed bias for all other types of differences between simulation model and reality. 
The combined effect of all differences in terms of bias and uncertainty at the accident risk level is depicted in 
Figure 1. At S = 25 km the actual risk is expected to be 3.5 times smaller than the model simulated risk level. The 
95% credibility interval has been assessed to range from a factor 4.5 higher to a factor 12.2 lower than the expected 
risk. Comparing the expected risk with the target level of safety, it follows that the safe spacing for the operation 
considered may be about 4 km less than concluded on basis of the model-simulated risk level.  
 
Table 5 Examples of uncertainties in the model risk due to uncertainty in parameter values.  
Parameter Uncertainty 
il  
Risk 
sensitivity
| |is  
Risk 
uncertainty
| |is
ïl  
Number of aircraft entering each lane per hour Significant Significant Significant 
Probability of wrong clearance by controller in opportunistic control 
mode 
Major Significant Significant 
Standard deviation of vertical position of aircraft Minor Significant Minor 
Maximum course deviation during turn of aircraft Significant Minor Minor 
Mean duration of communication by controller Significant Minor Minor 
Lateral acceleration in turn Minor Minor Small 
Standard deviation of transversal position in non-nominal mode Significant Negligible Negligible 
 
Table 6 Examples of bias assessment (+ or - indicate higher/lower risk of the actual operation with respect 
to the modeled operation).  
Other model assumption Type Prob. 
f
ip   
Bias 
f
iq  
Risk bias 
(Table 4) 
No semi-circular use of route structure Concept Typical Major - Major - 
There is no Short Term Conflict Alert system Concept Typical Significant - Significant - 
Aircraft do not run out of fuel Hazard 
coverage 
Unlikely Significant + Negligible + 
Pilot does not disconnect the autopilot deliberately Hazard 
coverage 
Unlikely Minor + Negligible + 
Ground aircraft tracking uses alpha-beta filter and 
single radar coverage only is considered 
Model structure Typical Minor - Minor - 
Pilot performance mode is independent of modes of 
technical systems or air traffic controller 
Model structure Regular Significant + Minor + 
There is zero probability that the aircraft pair 
collides after time HT  
Numerical Unlikely Significant + Negligible + 
5  DISCUSSION 
This paper has developed a novel structured approach to assess bias and uncertainty at accident risk level that 
are caused by differences between Monte Carlo simulations and reality. In order to enable such a structured approach 
we developed a novel mathematical model that captures various types of differences and analyses them in terms of 
bias and uncertainty at the risk level. A crucial preparatory step is to identify all these differences and to formulate 
each of them unambiguously in terms of a model assumption. 
Evaluation of parameter value assumptions is supported by a sensitivity analysis of the model-based risk for 
variation of single parameter values, while all other parameters have their nominal values. This is then combined 
with estimation of the bias and 95% credibility interval of the assumed parameter values to yield an estimate of bias 
and uncertainty, in terms of expected value and 95% credibility interval, at the accident risk level of the Monte Carlo 
simulation model.   
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The bias assessment for other differences than those of parameter values is achieved by a combination of the 
alternate hypotheses and adjustment factor approaches of [3]. In particular, the difference in the expected risk due to 
each non-parameter difference is evaluated via two variables: 
1. the probability that the assumption is false (the alternate hypothesis), and 
2. the conditional risk bias given that the assumption is false (the adjustment factor).  
These variables are evaluated by teams of safety experts and operational experts, taking into account 
dependencies between their evaluations. The estimation of these two factors by experts appears to work quite 
naturally, especially since the estimation of the conditional risk bias is supported by the risk sensitivity knowledge 
for each of the model parameters stemming from assessment of the parameter assumptions. It has been illustrated 
how this structured approach can be effectively applied to an en-route air traffic operation, including a wide range of 
types of differences.  
Further refinement of the mathematical background is ongoing. One direction [14] is to extend the mathematical 
background such that bias and uncertainty assessment can be done for a whole range of operational conditions, rather 
than for one specific working condition (e.g. for all S values in Figure 1, rather than for one S value). Another 
direction is to extend the bias and uncertainty mathematical model such that conditions regarding log-linearity and 
conditional independency between differences in parameter values are relaxed [15]. Two other complementary 
directions are:  
i) to extend our expert based bias assessment of non-parameter differences to conditions under which the 
mathematical bias and uncertainty model holds true; and 
ii) to incorporate estimation of uncertainty in risk level due to differences other than parameter values. 
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